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ABSTRACT
Data protection regulations give individuals rights to obtain the information that entities have on them.
However, providing such information can also reveal aspects of the underlying technical infrastructure and
organisational processes. This article explores the security implications this raises, and highlights the need
to consider such in rights fulfillment processes.
INDEX TERMS data protection, security, privacy, rights, law, regulation, systems
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen multiple security incidents and unau-
thorised data disclosures. As a result, awareness of cyber
security issues have been increasing, and security has become
a board-level concern [8]. Companies understandably wish to
protect themselves against crime, attacks, and other sources
of security problems. The desire to avoid the fall out of se-
curity breaches, in terms of interruption, reputational damage
and financial loss is a major concern.
There are also drivers from the legal requirements around
data security. In particular, European data protection law
requires that those responsible for processing personal data
(‘data controllers’) implement data protection principles in
system design and take appropriate technical and security
measures to guard against the risks of data breaches. The
same law also provides for various rights of individuals
(‘data subjects’) with regard to personal data relating to
them, including the right to obtain details regarding their
personal data, and, in certain circumstances, to transfer some
data to another data controller.
Previous work by others has considered the relationship
between data protection by design requirements, privacy con-
cerns, and subject access rights [14]. This revealed a trade-
off made by some data controllers in pursuit of the principle
of data protection by design, often viewed shortsightedly,
inadvertently or perhaps deliberately by data controllers as
a confidentiality problem to be addressed by “Privacy En-
hancing Technologies”. Taking this narrow, rather than more
holistic approach to data protection resulted in hindering data
subjects from exercising their rights.
This paper considers aspects of data subject rights as they
relate to security, in the context of the EU’s General Data
Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) [5]. Specifically, we explore
the security aspects as they relate to the individuals involved
in a particular exercise of rights and also those that relate to
controller obligations. The first of these concerns potential
security issues resulting from the process of exercising and
fulfilling these rights, an area of which there appears some
awareness. The second relates to potential security issues re-
sulting from the data provided in response to rights requests,
and what that might reveal about the data controller’s techni-
cal infrastructure and organisational processes. Generally, the
security implications for controllers in fulfilling rights does
not appear to be widely considered.
In all, we argue that in meeting data subject rights (focus-
ing on the rights of access and portability), data controllers
need also to consider any security risks in fulfilling such
rights; in this case, particularly as they relate to making
disclosures about the controller’s technical infrastructure or
organisational processes. However, as we emphasise, this is
not a trade-off: data controllers must both fulfil data subject
rights and meet security obligations. Failure to do so can have
consequences for controllers, not only by way of potentially
significant penalties and other regulatory sanctions, but more
broadly through reputational harm, loss of business, financial
damage, and so forth. By raising awareness of these issues
our aim is to encourage the development of practices and
mechanisms that both facilitate the exercise of data subject
rights while also ensuring the security of data and processing
activities.
II. GDPR: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS
The General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’) estab-
lishes a legal framework governing the processing of personal
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data. Personal data is any information relating to an individ-
ual who can be identified, either directly or indirectly, from
that data (or from that data in combination with other data)
(GDPR Art. 4(1)). Personal data may include not only names,
addresses, ID numbers, and so on, but also potentially device
IDs, IP addresses (dynamic or static), online identifiers, and
a range of other data relating to the specific characteristics of
the individual. Processing refers to any operation performed
on personal data, including collection, storage, retrieval, con-
sultation, alteration, adaptation, and use (Art. 4(2)).
Under GDPR, any natural or legal person, public author-
ity, agency, or other body involved in processing personal
data acts as a data controller or as a data processor. Data
controllers are the entities which determine the means and
purposes of processing (Art. 4(7)). Data processors are any
entity that processes personal data on behalf of and under the
direction of a data controller (Art. 4(8) and Art. 28(2)), and
should assist data controllers to meet their obligations (Art.
28(3)(f)).
A. A BASIS IN RIGHTS
Under EU law, data protection is considered to be a fun-
damental right distinct from and of equal significance to
the right to privacy [1]. While GDPR came into force in
2018 and brought increased attention to the subject, data
protection as a concept and as a right has a long history [13].
Human rights treaties such as the European Convention on
Human Rights in 1950, while not explicitly providing for data
protection, established a foundation for various countries to
develop early forms of data protection frameworks in the
1950s and 60s. The Convention on Data Protection, agreed
by the member countries of the Council of Europe in 1981,
followed the OECD’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, published in 1980.
The UK passed its first Data Protection Act in 1984, and the
Data Protection Directive in 1995 established data protection
obligations at EU level for the first time. The EU’s Charter
of Fundamental Rights, including data protection in Article
8, was passed in 2000 and took full legal effect in 2009
alongside the Treaty of Lisbon.
GDPR, in expanding upon the fundamental right to data
protection as established in the Charter, affords several rights
to data subjects (the individuals to whom personal data
relates) (Art. 4(1)). These rights are summarised in Fig. 1.
While other rights may have security implications (for ex-
ample, where data subjects make targeted erasure requests),
our focus here is on those rights which, upon their exercise,
generally result in the transfer of data from data controller to
data subject – the right of access (Art. 15) and the right to
portability (Art. 20).
The right of access (sometimes called ‘subject access’)
provides that data subjects have a right to be told whether
a data controller is processing personal data relating to them,
and, where that is the case, access to that personal data and
to an array of other information (Art. 15). This information
includes, among other things, the purposes of processing, the
Data subject rights under GDPR
Art. 15 Right of access The right to have their personal data provided to them 
(‘subject access request’)
Art. 16 Right to 
rectification
The right to correct inaccurate personal data
Art. 17 Right to erasure A qualified right to require erasure of their personal data 
(‘right to be forgotten’)
Art. 18 Right to restriction A qualified right to restrict the processing of their personal 
data
Art. 20 Right to portability A qualified right to transfer their personal data to another 
data controller
Art. 21 Right to object A qualified right to require the data controller to stop 
processing their personal data
Art. 22 Automated 
decision-making
The right to not be subject to solely automated decision-
making which produces legal or similarly significant effects
FIGURE 1. Data subject rights provided for under GDPR. Qualified rights can
be exercised when certain conditions are met (e.g. where processing is taking
place under a particular specified legal basis).
categories of personal data being processed, the recipients or
categories of recipient to whom the personal data has been
disclosed, and the period for which the data will be stored.
To fulfil this right, the data controller should provide a copy
of the personal data being processed, but this should not
adversely affect the rights and freedoms of others.
The right to portability is a more limited and qualified
right than the right of access. It establishes that data subjects
have the right to the receive in a structured, commonly used,
and machine-readable format that personal data that they
have provided to a data controller, or to transmit that data
to another controller without hindrance from the original
controller (Art. 20). This right applies where the data is
being processed either with the data subject’s consent or as
part of a contract between them and the data controller, and
only where the processing is being carried out by automatic
means.
B. OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED: RIGHTS AND SECURITY
As well as providing for these data subject rights, GDPR also
imposes various obligations on data controllers and proces-
sors, both in relation to fulfilling data subject rights and in
relation to security. These obligations come with potentially
severe penalties for failure to comply.
Data controllers are under an obligation to facilitate data
subjects in exercising their rights and to fulfil requests to
exercise those rights (Art. 12). In relation to subject access
and portability requests, they must provide information with-
out undue delay and in a concise, transparent, intelligible
and easily accessible form (Art. 12(1)). This can be done
in writing or electronically. Data controllers can only refuse
to fulfil these requests if they can show that they aren’t in a
position to identify the data subject (Art. 11).
Security is also a core data protection principle (Art.
5(1)(f)). Data controllers and processors are obliged to take
technical and organisational security measures appropriate
for managing the risk to the rights and freedoms of natural
persons incurred in processing personal data (Art. 32). In
assessing the risks incurred in processing, particular attention
should be paid to the risks of accidental or unlawful destruc-
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tion, loss, alteration, unauthorised disclosure of, or access to
personal data. Technical and organisational measures could
include, depending on the risks, for example, pseudonymisa-
tion and encryption of personal data; ensuring the confiden-
tiality, integrity, and resilience of processing systems; clearly
defined staff roles, policies and procedures; and processes for
routinely testing and evaluating the effectiveness of technical
and organisational security measures (Art 32(1)).
GDPR’s enforcement regime provides a strong incentive
for controllers to manage data properly, to meet security obli-
gations, and to fulfil data subject rights. Indeed, the possibil-
ity of fines of up to 4 per cent of global turnover for violations
under GDPR (Art. 83(5)) has captured mainstream attention.
But fines of that severity are likely to only be imposed for
the most serious and sustained breaches, and only for certain
types of violation. While up to the greater of e20m or 4
per cent of global turnover is indeed the maximum fine for
failures to meet various obligations, including failure to fulfil
data subject rights, other penalties are available to regulators.
For failure to meet other obligations, including those relating
to security, fines of up to the greater of e10m or 2 per cent of
global turnover may be imposed (Art. 83(4)). Regulators also
have various other enforcement powers in addition to fines,
which include ordering data controllers to fulfil data subject
rights, to order data controllers to bring their processing
operations into compliance within a specified period, and to
ban data controllers from processing personal data (Art. 58).
The latter, in particular, may have severe consequences for
data controllers.
III. CONSIDERATIONS IN FULFILLING RIGHTS
REQUESTS
An individual exercising their rights can represent a serious
undertaking. This means that a data controller improperly
handling a request can have significant implications for the
individuals involved. For instance, access and portability
requests typically reveal a sizeable quantity of sensitive in-
formation: in a portability context potentially including all
relevant data ever given to the provider, and in an access
context, potentially also including data which has not been
given by the subject to the data controller. Such data often
represents far more than is ordinarily accessible through
general means (e.g. use of that service). Similar concerns are
also relevant to other rights, e.g. the right of erasure might
result in irrevocable damage to an individual if actioned
incorrectly, and so forth.
It follows that there are security considerations for con-
trollers regarding the handling of a rights request, including
relating to the validation of the requester’s identity, process-
ing of the request itself, and the means by which the result
is returned. Indeed, a controller fulfilling data subject rights
would itself constitute processing, and would be subject to
the same security requirements as any other form of process-
ing.
A. USER AUTHENTICATION
It is important for a controller to verify the identity of the
individual making the request. Means for authentication are
paramount for ensuring the requestor is who they claim, and
should be employed before any request is actioned. If the data
controller has reasonable doubts about the identity of a data
subject, they are permitted to request further information so
as to assist identification (Art. 12(6)).
Data can be processed where the identity of the data
subject may not be (directly) known. Where the controller
can demonstrate that this is the case, they are not obliged
to acquire or process personal data solely for the purpose
of identification (Art. 11). However, they may not refuse
additional data offered by the data subject to assist with
identification (GDPR Recital 57). We have previously argued
that mobile platforms should provide means, including those
facilitating identification, to assist subjects in exercising their
rights against app developers [11].
In a digital context, data subjects should normally be able
to use their usual credentials to authenticate and prove their
identity (Recital 57). At a minimum, where the data subject
can login to a service using their credentials, authentication
for fulfilling access and portability requests should at least
maintain the same level of security as for the normal user
login process. In some cases, where the data involved may
be particularly revealing, it may be good practice to employ
means for more stringent authentication. Where more than
one method of contacting the data subject is available, the use
of multi-factor authentication (perhaps coupled with request
validation, see below) may be appropriate [9].
However, data controllers should be aware that they can
only use reasonable means to identify data subjects, par-
ticularly in the context of online services (Recital 64). Ac-
cording to the guidance [7] from the UK’s data protection
regulator, the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), rea-
sonableness will depend on the circumstances. Where the
identity of the requester is known to the data controller,
for example, they shouldn’t request substantially more infor-
mation (perhaps particularly where the data controller has
an ongoing relationship with the requester). On the other
hand, where there is some reasonable uncertainty about the
identity of the requester, it would be prudent for the data
controller to request identifying information; for example,
where the requester uses an email address known to the
data controller but requests that the personal data be sent
to a postal address other than the one on file. The potential
harm caused by inappropriate disclosure should also be a
consideration in assessing reasonableness, which can include
whether the personal data involved is particularly revealing
– health information a prime example. Note that while this
guidance relates to the subject access process prior to GDPR,
the reasonableness requirement is substantively the same.
Controllers are therefore not permitted to require data
subjects to submit to unreasonable identification processes,
such as to provide more information than would be necessary
to confirm their identity. This means that, if adopting an addi-
3
tional level of security for authenticating users for access and
portability requests, data controllers must ensure that they do
not impose a burden on data subjects seeking to exercise their
rights, or request excessive identifying information.
B. PROCESSING THE REQUEST
Related to identity, it would be good practice in some con-
texts to further validate that it was in fact the subject that
made the request [11]. For instance, in an online context,
emailing a confirmation link to the account’s registered email
address can help avoid situations where someone’s account
with the service (but not their email) has been compromised,
or where a login-session has been hijacked after failing
to logout of a shared machine, their phone has been left
unlocked, and so forth.
Once the requestor’s identity and request has been vali-
dated, the next step is to ensure that the request is responded
to appropriately. While controllers are obliged to fulfil re-
quests, they are permitted to refuse requests where they are
manifestly unfounded or excessive (Art. 12(5)). This pro-
vides a means, for example, to prevent something of a ‘denial
of service’ by way of repetitive requests. Should controllers
refuse to fulfil a request on these grounds, they are obliged
to give reasons demonstrating that this is the case (Art. 12(5)
and Recital 59). Note that data subjects are not and should
not be obliged to state their motives in making a request. In
practice, controllers may find other factors indicative, such
as the character and timing of the requests, particularly those
frequently repeated.
Naturally, it is important for controllers to have processes
in place to ensure the proper handing of the request, that the
data requested relates to the data subject, and that, through
quality assurance, data is validated before it is returned.
While these seem exceedingly obvious, data breaches have
resulted from improperly handling rights requests – in one
reported example, the results of an access request included
the data pertaining to a different individual that had also made
a request [15].
C. PROTECTING THE RESPONSE
The mechanism by which responses are delivered also war-
rants attention. As discussed, the results of a right of access or
portability request are potentially revealing, not only because
the data they include is inherently personal, but also because
it represents an aggregation of personal data. Having access
to all of one’s interactions on a social media platform over
a period of time, for instance, provides information beyond
that accessible through general use of the account, by re-
vealing information of hidden (‘deleted’) messages, blocked
contacts, and so on.
As such, measures by which responses are protected, or
which reduce the risk of data leakage, warrant consideration
by controllers. Simply emailing a response (unencrypted) to
the user’s registered email address might be convenient and
acceptable in some circumstances, but is arguably insufficient
in others – especially if data relates to financial matters,
special categories of personal data, and so on.
Less common are means to protect the data once it moves
‘off-platform’. This is not an explicit obligation for the con-
troller, but seems useful from a security point of view. One
example might be to deliver the archive in an encrypted form
with a user-specified password, so that even if the archive is
leaked its contents still have some degree of protection.
D. IMPLEMENTATION
It appears that some organisations have given consideration
to such issues. Our experience in exercising our rights with
various organisations has provided evidence of some com-
mon measures being taken, including:
1) Ensuring the request and download of information
occurs through the controller’s platform, meaning users
are validated through the platform’s standard access
control procedures (although requests made via an-
other method, for example email, must still be ful-
filled).
2) Sending an email to the account’s registered address
notifying that a request has been made, and sometimes
requiring that user to confirm the request, as a means
for alerting data subjects and mitigating any issues
should their account (and thus the request, though not
their email) be compromised.1
3) Having the information archive only downloadable for
a short time after the request, to restrict the possibility
for distribution or future leakage.
IV. ORGANISATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS
The security considerations just described concern the pro-
tection of personal data related to making and fulfilling a
request. In these cases, where a failure occurs, the data breach
(or other issue) typically concerns those data subjects to
whom the request (or response) relates. There is some aware-
ness of these problems – as shown by guidance on related
issues produced by Supervisory Authorities (data protection
regulators) around, for example, identity verification [7], the
GDPR recitals, and so forth.
Less discussed in a rights context, however, are the poten-
tial security risks facing the controller. The data returned as
part of an access or portability request might reveal aspects
of the controller’s technical infrastructure and its implemen-
tation, and could also indicate the nature of the organisational
processes that are in place. Revealing such information can
1A confirmation step seems more appropriate than simply alerting, as it
gives some extra assurance that the data subject actually made the request,
while discouraging opportunism (e.g. someone leaving a machine ‘logged-
in’). On one social media platform we observed that an email was sent
immediately on request, notifying that the request was made through their
platform, and stating that the account may be compromised if this request
was unfamiliar. The time taken from receiving the request notification until
the entire information archive became available was ~19min, and the archive
was directly accessible through the platform (no email access required). This
gives very little time for a user, whose account may be compromised, to
respond.
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pose a security risk, as it may help in facilitating a cyber
attack.
This bears consideration, not least because a security in-
cident affecting the controller can be systemic and result in
harms at scale. This has direct data protection implications
– for example, a security breach might leak data on all
data subjects (as opposed to just those relating to a request
(per §III)). Note also that security issues extend beyond data
protection, e.g. where issues of system downtime can impact
users, possibly with significant consequences, such as where
the service represents some critical infrastructure.
A. CYBER RECONNAISSANCE
Information gathering is an important stage of a cyber at-
tack. That is, knowledge about a potential target—be it of
their technical infrastructure or organisational processes—
helps facilitate an attack [3]. Having information about the
technology employed (for instance, the software used and
version numbers, network configuration, open ports, and so
forth) might reveal attack vectors, exploitable systems to
target once the organisation is infiltrated, and potentially pos-
sible countermeasures or protections employed. Similarly,
knowledge of the social and organisational practices of an
organisation can guide strategy around the means for the
attack [4], expected response time, investigative capability,
vulnerable business processes and susceptible staff, and so
forth.
At a technical level, it is common for networks to be used
for nefarious information gathering purposes, since a net-
work renders a remote system reachable. Major technology
service providers report thousands of cyber incidents each
day, often detecting the use of automated tools that scan
and probe both for information about the host being queried
and to indicate potential vulnerabilities (for example, out-
dated software, improper configuration, and so on). Note that
such techniques are used defensively (e.g. by organisations
seeking to improve their security) and offensively (e.g. by
cyber criminals). Towards this, various intrusion detection
and prevention tools involve monitoring to uncover and mit-
igate imminent threats (including reconnaissance efforts), or
actual security violations (see [12]). Such operations might
be targeted at a specific organisation, or could be more
‘scatter-gun’, e.g. where a whole series of network addresses
could be probed to find potential targets.
However, not all information gathering methods are tech-
nical [4]. Cyber crime operations are known to use people
as part of their attack strategy. This could involve social
engineering (i.e. deceiving a staff member to reveal particular
information or take an action) [10], a malicious insider,
which may be bribed, extorted, or perhaps a ‘plant’ employed
specifically to facilitate an attack [6].
B. EXPOSING THE ORGANISATION
In this rights context, an interesting consideration is that a
controller, by providing information, could potentially ex-
pose the underlying technology and processes of the organ-
isation. In other words, there is the potential that the infor-
mation provided by fulfilling access and portability requests
could assist cyber reconnaissance. Indeed, these data access
rights present a new method for ‘information gathering’,
providing a legal mechanism whereby potentially deep or-
ganisational internals are exposed – information that would
otherwise be generally inaccessible externally or difficult to
obtain.
Of course, any risk depends on circumstances, and in
particular, the nature of the request and information returned
in the controller’s response. That said, there appears to be
little discussion of such risks, meaning that organisations
may well be, inadvertently, leaking information that might
have security implications. The fact that controllers are pro-
viding direct data exports from technical components [2],
[15] suggests these aspects have had little consideration.
Illustrating some risks
We now illustrate some of the possible risks that might
result from the responses to access and portability requests.
Our discussion here is only indicative; again, any risks will
depend on the particular circumstances.
First, the response can indicate the software, services, and
technologies used, particularly where the data forms an ‘ex-
tract’ directly from a technical system. Such details might be
revealed directly or indirectly, e.g. through metadata included
in a report describing the package or version number, as a
screenshot where the interface indicates the software used,
or perhaps where certain data structures and formats imply
the use of a particular products or services (see Fig 2). Such
information could assist technical attacks, where knowledge
of the software stack and its vulnerabilities might facilitate
an exploit. It can also provide the background for facilitat-
ing spearphishing attacks (attacks targeting particular staff
members, e.g. through fake emails about or resembling those
common to the application used), social engineering (e.g. by
masquerading as a technical support with detailed knowledge
of the software used), and other forms of deception (see [10]).
Another consideration is whether the data returned can in-
dicate some of the risk mitigation measures that the controller
employs. For instance, if logging/audit records are revealed
(as they often should be if they are associated with a data sub-
ject), it can help indicate some of the organisation’s security
strategy: Are failed-logins recorded? Do such records include
the IP address? Is every input made throughout their web
application recorded? These aspects can influence a would-
be attacker’s strategy; for instance, if few records appear
to be kept, a bolder systems-interrogation approach might
be encouraged as it suggests a lack of capability by the
organisation to detect and investigate such.
It is reportedly common that a direct extract (‘dump’) from
the database is returned as with a request [2]. In addition
to including the personal data, generally such information
will also reveal the database schema—the way information
is structured—including the fields of data recorded and their
names, while the data itself can suggest the fields’ data
5
id login username usertype password
invalid_login_
attempts title firstname lastname
**** **** **** **** **** **** **** **** ****
FIGURE 2. A subset of (masked) customer information extracted from a database, in which aspects of the database schema are visible. A web search based on
this subset of field names makes clear this represents the use of a popular e-commerce software package. This information could then be used to facilitate an
attack, for instance, through a known vulnerability in that software package, by aiding social engineering, etc.
types. The example presented in Fig. 2 shows how a schema
reveals the software used, which, as discussed earlier, can
have implications.
The schema might also reveal some of the security mea-
sures employed. As above, database tables or fields that
appear dedicated to logging or audit might indicate the as-
pects of an application being monitored (and the aspects that
aren’t!). Regarding more organisational measures, the struc-
ture could suggest, for instance, over what aspects staff give
oversight – an [Approved_by] field in a table dedicated to
transactions might imply manual staff verification, or if a ta-
ble has separate fields regarding security verification answers
(a poor design), e.g. [Maiden_Name], [Fav_Song], . . . ,
revealing this indicates the background information required
to impersonate a particular target.
From a technical perspective, knowledge of the schema,
while not an attack vector itself, can provide the background
to assist in enabling system compromises. One common
attack type is injection [4], which essentially involves run-
ning malicious queries against a datastore. These queries can
entail reads (information leaks) or writes (modification and
deletion). Although injection attacks are well-known, and
mitigated by best-practices, they still represent an extremely
common vulnerability – ENISA recognising it as the top
form of web application attack [4]. As datastore queries
execute in line with the datastore’s schema, knowledge of
the schema can enable attacks (be they through injection,
or some other vector) to be more focused and streamlined
through predefined and targeted queries.
The above represent but a few examples of some poten-
tial security implications of rights requests that reveal the
controller’s underlying systems infrastructure. Again, any
risks depend on the specific circumstances; including the
type of request, data actually returned, the technical stack,
organisational processes, and so forth.
V. DISCUSSION
GDPR’s data subject rights reflect the human-rights foun-
dations of EU data protection law. They exist to inform
and empower people in relation to their personal data. As
such, fulfilling rights, including the right of access and right
to portability is an extremely important aspect of GDPR
compliance. Generally, organisational security concerns do
not and cannot trump data subject access rights, and must
not pose a barrier to exercising rights. This means that data
controllers should consider how access and portability rights
requests can be fulfilled in a way that is fully compliant
with the GDPR’s requirements, but that also minimises the
associated security risks. We now consider some potential
ways forward.
A. RAISING AWARENESS
Data controllers, as part of their security obligations, should
consider the security aspects of fulfilling data subject rights.
This cannot mean using security as a reason to not fully
comply with requests. However, it should mean that data
controllers are aware of and take steps to mitigate the po-
tential security risks which could arise in doing so. In other
words, controllers need to adopt a security-oriented mindset
in complying with access and portability requests.
To date, there appears to be little awareness of the security
implications for the controller in fulfilling rights requests.
Not only is there scant discussion of such issues (cf. §III), but,
from work analysing rights responses, it also seems that many
controllers are reactive in their approach to fulfilling rights
requests. For instance, providing data ‘dumps’ from technical
systems ( [2], [15]) suggests that rigorous assessments of the
risks to an organisation of fulfilling a rights request (in a
particular way) were not undertaken.
It may well be that many controllers, perhaps driven by a
rush to comply, were fairly ad-hoc in their responses; they
may not yet have defined rights fulfilment processes, let
alone subjected them to a rigorous security analysis. It’s also
conceivable that the rights requests were fulfilled by a team
or business unit that does not ordinarily conduct security risk
assessments, and did not consult with those undertaking such
assessments. One may expect such issues to occur more with
smaller firms, as larger firms may be more likely to have
in-house security expertise, measures for evaluating new
business operational processes, and so on; though larger firms
might have greater fragmentation amongst business groups,
giving more scope for things to ‘slip through the cracks’.
Regardless of the reasons, as we have outlined, there can
be risks in the way rights requests are served. As such, there
is a real need to raise awareness of these issues, so that
controllers can engineer their rights fulfilment processes to
account for possible security concerns. Indeed, this is a key
aim of this article.
One starting point might be through information provided
by Supervisory Authorities. As mentioned, these authorities
already issue guidance on fulfilling rights requests [7]. Hav-
ing guidance documents which also indicate that fulfilling
subject rights requests can bring security risks could alert and
encourage those dealing with requests to consider such issues
and seek advice and expertise where necessary.
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B. MODE OF PRESENTATION
GDPR provides for rights of access and portability in relation
to eligible personal data which is being processed. However,
in fulfilling these requests, the data provided to data subjects
need not necessarily reflect the underlying technical infras-
tructure, so long as all of the required data is in fact provided.
At its simplest level, controllers do not need to provide the
actual table headers, database schema, software metadata
(name, version number), and other potentially revealing in-
formation. In some cases, security concerns could mean that
obfuscating the underlying technical infrastructure in some
way is a necessary measure to help data controllers continue
to meet their security-related obligations under GDPR.
The need to consider the security implications of providing
responses to rights requests could also result in making the
responses more useful. This could potentially incentivise data
controllers to find ways to present the data provided in re-
sponse to subject access requests in such a way as to be more
understandable and intuitive for data subjects. At a simplest
level, this could entail translating column headers from a
technical specification to names that are more descriptive.
More creative approaches are certainly possible. However, a
concern is that data controllers might use the presentation
of information in an attempt to minimise or reduce the
prominence of data they consider inconvenient. It should be
emphasised that, regardless of the format chosen for display-
ing data, all data should be returned and controllers must not
mislead data subjects about what data is being processed.
Portability necessarily involves representing the data in a
technical format. GDPR’s requirements that data provided
in response to portability requests is given in a structured,
commonly used format gives fewer possibilities for curation.
However, even a technical representation need not include
extraneous system-related data (e.g. software version num-
bers), nor use the same descriptors as the actual underlying
system; and indeed, requirements for data portability to be
in a common format could well make such extraneous or
specific information inappropriate. Further, there may well
be scope for making the data more ‘technically’ useful rather
than strictly representing that of the underlying technical
system.
C. STANDARDS AND PRACTICES
The development of standards, and ‘best-practices’, as they
relate to serving requests can assist as (i) they not only en-
courage firms to consider and develop processes for fulfilling
data requests, but (ii) also likely entail some translation (and
thought) in mapping the local data, systems and processes to
that of the standard. This can help either explicitly, where
implementing a standard provides an opportunity for the
organisation to consider the security risks as it defines its pol-
icy, and also implicitly, where adhering to the standard might
naturally work to obfuscate (some) the underlying details,
including removing the inclusion of extraneous metadata
that could otherwise be obtained through ‘technical dumps’.
Ideally, security considerations should feature as part of any
rights-oriented standards development processes.
1) Interoperability standards
Though standards, and the translation they entail, can gen-
erally assist such issues, they are especially relevant for the
right of the portability. The motivation for the right is to
encourage competition, as a means to enable data subjects to
migrate to other services (controllers) should they wish. The
Art. 20 right to portability requires (i) controllers to provide
data in a technical format, and (ii) where technically possible,
to enable a controller to directly transfer the subject’s data to
another service. Interoperability standards are already being
discussed, as a means to facilitate both these aspects. Indeed,
GDPR suggests that data controllers should be encouraged to
develop interoperability standards (Recital 68), and Supervi-
sory Authorities may have a role to play.
Platform-based approaches to common standards are be-
ginning to emerge. For example, there is the Data Trans-
fer Project (see https://datatransferproject.dev/), which is an
open-source project primarily led by the tech giants. Its
key aim is to facilitate the ‘direct transfer’ aspect of the
right to portability between service providers, and security is
mentioned as a key consideration. Though a direct transfer
regime brings efficiency and can preclude disclosing the
raw data back to data subjects (if the subjects desire direct
transfer), subjects still maintain the right under portability
to have access to this information. As portability platforms
develop, facilitating transfer necessarily requires standards
and processes to be implemented – which again provide
opportunities for organisations to consider and reduce their
security risks.
2) Emerging best practice
There are also projects underway that aim at providing plat-
forms to assist data subjects in exercising their rights, by
giving information and tooling.2 In line with the awareness
aspect already discussed, these subject-oriented (i.e. people-
focused) platforms also bring visibility over the practices of
various organisations, by operating across them. In turn, this
can encourage better practices (de-facto standards), though
coordinating subject demands, and where controllers can
learn from others as to the appropriate (and inappropriate)
information to include in requests.
More generally, organisations do not operate in a vacuum
– knowledge and approaches are often shared. Therefore it
may also be beneficial for data controllers to exchange and
share knowledge of practices in relation to data subject rights
and security, perhaps through professional or industry bodies,
as well as through more informal forums. This would allow
experience and knowledge to transfer between organisations,
ideally raising the standards of industry as a whole.
2For an indicative list, see https://datarights.wiki/index.php/List_of_all_
access_request_projects.
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VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Data rights are a fundamental aspect of data protection
regulations. And while organisations increasingly recognise
the importance of cyber security, so far there has been little
discussion regarding the security implications of data subject
rights. Here we have argued that controllers should consider
and account for the possible security risks as they fulfil
rights requests. It has been observed that there are tensions
between privacy mechanisms and exercising rights [11], [14],
where confidentiality mechanisms can inhibit rights fulfil-
ment. What we have discussed is in a similar space; though
we focus on where fulfilling right requests has resulting secu-
rity implications. To reiterate, this should not be considered
a trade-off between rights and security, not only because of
the importance of rights, but also because many risks can be
mitigated through integrating some security-thinking into the
methods and processes by which rights are fulfilled. Rather,
awareness seems the key concern – to date, there appears
little discussion of such issues. And while improvements
may occur naturally as organisational approaches to data
protection mature, at present, rights-related security issues
warrant greater attention.
In all, this appears to be an opportunity. A more security-
oriented approach to rights fulfilment works to improve
controller security, which in turn can help prevent attacks,
hacks, and possible breaches that can have wide-reaching
consequences for data subjects, controllers and beyond. At
the same time, forcing more attention on the way information
is delivered to data subjects also provides an opening to con-
sider how such responses can be more useful and meaningful.
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